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The Jurisdictional Limits of Qāḍī Courts  
during the Umayyad Period
Steven Judd
Abstract: This paper examines the function and jurisdiction of the qāḍī during the Umayyad 
period, focusing on the limits of the qāḍī’s power and on his relationship to other power holders 
in Umayyad society. Based on an examination of biographies of more than seventy Umayyad 
qāḍī‑s, this paper demonstrates that qāḍī‑s had unquestioned jurisdiction over marriage, 
divorce, inheritance, and other “family law”. Neither local elites nor political leaders were 
above the qāḍī in such cases. However, the qāḍī had no jurisdiction over cases involving rebels 
and heretics. Nor did they determine the division of spoils. These examples suggest that the 
jurisdictional limits of qāḍī courts were well‑established during the Umayyad period.
Keywords: Umayyads, Qadi, Courts, arbiter, Marriage and divorce, Inheritance, Heresy.
Résumé : Cet article examine les fonctions et les compétences du cadi à l’époque omeyyade, 
en s’interrogeant sur les limites de son pouvoir et sur sa relation à d’autres autorités de la 
société omeyyade. Fondé sur un examen des biographies de plus de soixante‑dix cadis, l’article 
déḍontre que ceuxīci avaient une coḍpétence incontestée sur Ḍes afaires de ḍariageĪ de 
divorce, d’héritage et relevant d’autres domaines du « droit de la famille ». Ni les élites locales, 
ni les dirigeants politiques n’étaient au‑dessus du cadi dans de tels cas. Toutefois, le cadi 
n’avait pas juridiction sur les cas impliquant les rebelles et les hérétiques. Ils ne pouvaient 
pas non plus se prononcer sur la division du butin. Ces exemples suggèrent que les limites 
juridictionnelles des tribunaux de cadis étaient bien établies à l’époque omeyyade.
Mots‑clés : Omeyyades, cadi, tribunaux, arbitre, mariage et divorce, successions, hérésie.
الملخص : تعالج هذه المقالة وظيفة القاضي وصاحياته في العصر اأموي، تركيزا على حدود سلطة 
القاضي وعاقته مع أصحاب السلطة اآخرين في المجتمع اأموي. واعتماداً على دراسة تراجم أكثر من 
سبعين قاض أموي تظهر هذه المقالة أن القضاة كانوا يتمّتعون بصاحيات معترف بها على كّل القضايا 
التي تخّص الزواج والطاق واإرث وغيرها من اأحوال الشخصية. وفي هذه اأمور لم يكن أحد من 
النخب المحّلية وا الحكام السياسيون فوق سلطة القاضي. إا أن محاكمة المتمّردين والهراطقة لم 
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تدخل في صاحيات القضاة، كما أنهم لم يقدروا على توزيع الغنائم. فتظهر هذه اأمثال أن حدود 
صاحيات محكمة القاضي كانت ثابتة في العصر اأموي. 
الكلمات المحوريّة : دولة بني أمية، القضاة، مجلس القضاء، حَكَم، الزواج والطاق، وراثة، هرطقة.
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The qāḍī is one of the few oiciaḌs in earḌy IsḌaḍic adḍinistration consistentḌy 
ḍentioned in the sources. MedievaḌ chronicḌersĪ such as ḪaḌ fa b. Ḫayyā  (d. 240/854) and 
aḌī abar  (d. 310/923) typicaḌḌy Ḍist those who served as qāḍī‑s in important cities during 
the Umayyad period, along with those who acted as governors and heads of the police 
(šurṭa).1 In the chronicles, the qāḍīship stands as a mark of administrative continuity from 
the tiḍe of the Rā idūn forward. Despite the Ḍongevity of the qāḍīship and its obvious 
importance both for administrative order and for the articulation of Islamic legal doctrine, 
little is preserved about the actual functioning of the qāḍīship during the Umayyad period. 
Archival records have not survived, assuming such records ever existed. Nor are other 
judicial documents or procedural manuals from the Umayyad period extant. Consequently, 
analyses of the Umayyad era qāḍīship must rely on later sources, written during or after 
the ʿAbbāsid period. These sources bring with theḍ a variety of assuḍptions about the 
nature of the qāḍīship, derived from later authors’ understandings of the origins of more 
forḍaḌized ʿAbbāsidīera institutions. These assuḍptions have inforḍedĪ and in soḍe cases 
distorted, both medieval and modern discussions of the qāḍīship during the Umayyad 
period. MoreoverĪ Ḍater ʿAbbāsidīera discussions of the jurisdiction of the qāḍī courts 
occurred after the emergence of the maẓālim courtsĪ which couḌd ofer an aḌternative 
legal venue and whose functions could overlap with those of the qāḍī courts. As a result, 
these later treatments of the qāḍīship couḌd project ʿAbbāsidīera deḌineations of authority 
between the two court systems onto the Umayyad period, when only one of the two 
institutions existed, at least formally.
The discussion that follows will focus narrowly on jurisdictional boundaries, in an 
efort to deḌineate the extent of the qāḍī’s legal jurisdiction during the Umayyad period. 
It begins with a summary of traditional views of the qāḍī’s function and jurisdiction. Then 
it turns to a ḍore focused exaḍination of cases described in the sourcesĪ ofering insights 
into the extent of the qāḍī‑s’ jurisdiction based on cases they purportedly heard. Finally, it 
wiḌḌ ofer a ḍore nuanced understanding of the jurisdictionaḌ Ḍiḍits of the qāḍī’s authority 
and demonstrate the real power qāḍī‑s could wield.
Modern scholarship has produced two divergent, though occasionally overlapping 
views of the nature and origin of the early Islamic qāḍīship. The irst interpretation treats 
the qāḍī as essentially an Islamized version of the tribal ḥakam. In Arabian traditional 
society, ḥakam‑s served as arbitrators to resolve disputes within their individual tribal 
communities. They were respected for their wisdom, fairness, and understanding of tribal 
custoḍs. Perhaps their skiḌḌs as negotiators were as iḍportant as their knowḌedge of 
customs, since their authority required the consent of those between whom they judged and 
they lacked any coercive capacity to impose their decisions. The consequences of defying 
the ḥakam’s judgḍents are not speciic. PresuḍabḌyĪ those who reneged on proḍises to 
accept arbitration while simultaneously showing disrespect for a prestigious member of 
the coḍḍunity wouḌd sufer daḍage to their honor andĪ in extreḍe casesĪ ḍight inspire 
1. ḪaḌ fa b. Ḫayyā Ī Ta’rī ; aḌī abar Ī Ta’rī  al‑rusul wa‑l‑mulūk.
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retribution from the community at large. However, there was no formal mechanism for 
enforcement of the ḥakam’s rulings or punishment of the recalcitrant.
According to this interpretation, the arrival of Islam meant that these traditional 
dispute adjudicators were still prestigious members of the community who were 
considered to be wise and fair, but that they were now appointed, or at least sanctioned, 
by the caliph or governor. Consequently, the qāḍī was ultimately a holdover from earlier 
Arabian tribal culture, now with an Islamic hue and the additional authority conveyed by 
caliphal endorsement. This view has been common in modern scholarship on early Islamic 
law. Joseph Schacht was explicit in asserting that the qāḍī “took over the seat and wand of 
the ḥakam”.2
The second interpretive approach to the qāḍīship treats the qāḍī as an administrative 
extension of the governor and/or the caḌiph hiḍseḌf. This understanding of the oice of 
qāḍī presumes a more centralized, autocratic approach to legal administration. According 
to this model, the qāḍī serves as an enforcer of caliphal rules and regulations, imposing 
caliphally‑sanctioned uniformity on the community. It is through this enforcement function 
that the qāḍī implements the so‑called “Umayyad administrative practice” described by 
Joseph Schacht.3 The uniformity implied by this understanding of the qāḍīship restricts the 
qāḍī’s independence to a signiicant extent. No Ḍonger is he judging based on the nuances of 
individual cases and the best interests of the parties, as an arbitrator would. Instead, he is 
imposing rulings predetermined by the governor or the caliph. His function becomes more 
administrative under this model.
Another consequence of this interpretation is that the qāḍī’s jurisdiction is constrained 
by the governor’s oversight function. As an extension of the governor, the qāḍī cannot 
contradict the governor’s will, since his superior can overturn his decisions. Moreover, 
the governor can choose not to delegate his judicial authority to anyone, retaining the 
qāḍī’s powers for himself. This view has been presented most clearly by Emile Tyan, who 
envisioned a hierarchy of authority from the caliph to the governor to the qāḍī.4 Schacht 
also expressed this view, asserting that, “[d]uring the Umaiyad period the administration 
of justice lay in the hands of the provincial governors and, in so far as special judges were 
appointed, they were agents of the governors to whom these last delegated part of their 
functions”.5 More recently, similar views have been adopted by Mathieu Tillier.6 To some 
extent, Schacht tries to have it both ways, asserting that the qāḍī is a ḥakam, but that the 
governor somehow retains “full authority”.7 More recently, Wael Hallaq has espoused 
a similar, apparently contradictory view. He asserts on the one hand that the early qāḍī 
2. Schacht 1964Ī p. 24.
3. Schacht 1950Ī p. 190 f.
4. tyan 1960Ī p. 132 f. 
5. Schacht 1950Ī p. 191.
6. tillier 2009Ī p. 496ī504.
7. Schacht 1964Ī p. 25.
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was essentially a ḥakam, but also describes him as the “commander’s assistant” who was 
“usually subservient” to the amīr.8
These divergent views of the origin and function of the qāḍīship derive from two 
central themes in scholarship on Umayyad‑era institutions. On the one hand, modern 
schoḌars have tried to ind evidence of continuity with the preīIsḌaḍic past by focusing 
upon similarities between Umayyad‑era institutions and earlier Arabian, Byzantine or 
Sasanian precursors. Hence, the qāḍī is merely a ḥakam with a new name, a necessary 
functionary who now cloaks his rulings in Islamic rather than customary garb. On the 
other handĪ ḍodern schoḌars have tried to iḌḌ the docuḍentary void of the Uḍayyad 
period by reḌying on ʿAbbāsidīera sources and assuḍing that bureaucratic structures 
described therein have earlier precedents in the Umayyad era. This approach accepts that 
the hierarchicaḌ structures created by the reforḍs of severaḌ ʿAbbāsid caḌiphsĪ described 
in detail by Mathieu Tillier, had earlier roots.9 This image of Umayyad judicial order also 
relects to soḍe extent the ideaḌized vision of the judiciary presented in the various adab 
al‑qāḍī sources, which were written long after the Umayyad period.
An examination of other, less idealized sources, especially the biographical literature, 
ofers a diferent vision of the qāḍīship and its jurisdiction during the Umayyad period. 
As the discussion below will demonstrate, the qāḍī was neither a rebranded ḥakam nor an 
obedient arm of the governor. Instead, the extent of the qāḍī’s authority and the boundaries 
of his jurisdiction were ḍore coḍpḌicated andĪ perhaps surprisingḌyĪ ḍore cḌearḌy deined.
To come to this conclusion, it is necessary to examine the kinds of cases qāḍī‑s 
purportedly heard and to note as well the kinds of cases that they were not allowed to 
adjudicate. Analysis of actual cases allows us to understand both the legal limits of the 
qāḍī’s jurisdiction and the extent of his authority over various classes of people, elite and 
otherwise. Fortunately, accounts of some, though by no means many, of the cases heard by 
Umayyad qāḍī‑s do survive in a variety of sources.
While the qāḍī courts of the Umayyad era had nothing resembling archives, reports of 
a fair number of cases survive in other sources. In particular, the A bār al‑quḍāt of Wak ʿ 
(d. 306/918) and the A bār quḍāt Miṣr of aḌīKind  (d. 350/961) incḌude nuḍerous anecdotes 
describing qāḍī‑s’ activities.10 In addition, entries on individual qāḍī‑s found in the 
biographical sources provide important data. Accounts of cases included in these sources 
do provide useful insights into the extent of the qāḍī’s jurisdiction, but their limitations 
must not be ignored. These are not complete archives, and their compilers did not intend 
for them to serve such an administrative function. Instead, these sources include only those 
cases that later compilers found to be important or interesting for a variety of reasons. 
The bases for their decisions about what to record and what to discard are not explicit. 
Nor is there any clear indication about the degree of comprehensiveness of the sources 
  8. hallaq 2005Ī p. 35ī37.
  9. tillier 2009Ī p. 101ī135.
10. Wak ʿĪ A bār al‑quḍāt; aḌīKind Ī A bār quḍāt Miṣr. 
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from which they drew their materials. Accounts of many of the Umayyad qāḍī‑s contain 
no references to speciic casesĪ whiḌe others incḌude nuḍerous anecdotes about individuaḌ 
cases. The cases discussed below were culled from an examination of biographical and other 
accounts of some 75 Umayyad‑era qāḍī‑s. The data represents neither a comprehensive nor 
a randoḍ saḍpḌing of these cases. InsteadĪ these exaḍpḌes are incḌuded because they ofer 
insights into the structure and functioning of the Umayyad‑era qāḍīship and into how the 
institution’s Umayyad roots were perceived in later times.
The qāḍī’s areas of jurisdiction
The majority of cases described in these sources involve what modern scholars would 
call “family law”, disputes about marriage, divorce and inheritance. Cases involving 
marriage and divorce are particularly common. Some of these cases are mundane. For 
instanceĪ Wak ʿ reports that Saʿ d b. U ūʿaĪ the Uḍayyad qāḍī in Kufa froḍ 105ī113/724ī731Ī 
dissoḌved an iḍproper ḍarriage. Wak ʿ does not naḍe the Ḍitigants nor does he ofer detaiḌs 
about the nature of the iḍpropriety. It is cḌearĪ howeverĪ that there was no conlict about 
the qāḍī’s authority to judge whether the marriage was valid.11 In EgyptĪ Yūnus b. ʿA iyyaĪ 
who served as qāḍī froḍ 84ī86/703ī705 gained his position as qāḍī by settling a dispute 
about ḍaintenance payḍents for a divorced wife. AgainĪ detaiḌs of the case (and even 
his opinion) are not incḌuded.12 Tawba b. Namir, the Egyptian qāḍī froḍ 115ī120/733ī738Ī 
ordered a divorced man to pay compensation to his ex‑wife and then refused to accept the 
ḍan’s future testiḍony after he deied the qāḍī.13
Other marriage and divorce cases were more complicated and more interesting. For 
instanceĪ the Ba ran qāḍī Iyās b. Muʿāwiya (served 99ī101/717ī719) adjudicated a confusing 
divorce case in which the husband claimed that the divorce was invalid because he was 
drunk at the time.14 The two accounts Wak ʿ incḌudes difer over iḍportant detaiḌsĪ even 
regarding the identity of the parties. In the irst versionĪ both spouses were ḍeḍbers of the 
powerfuḌ MuhaḌḌab  faḍiḌy. When the wife refused a cup of wine ofered by her husbandĪ he 
procḌaiḍed that he wouḌd divorce her if she did not drink (anti ṭāliq ṯalāṯan in lam tašrabī‑hi). 
After her continued refusaḌ (and a sḍashed wine cup) she cḌaiḍed that he had divorced 
her, but he denied that he had actually pronounced the triple repudiation. In this version, 
Iyās airḍed the divorce based on testiḍony froḍ unnaḍed woḍen who were present. In 
Wak ʿ’s second accountĪ the parties are not naḍed. The husband is identiied as a ḍeḍber 
of the Bānū Kirāḍ who was a brotherīinīḌaw to the governorĪ and the wife is siḍpḌy froḍ 
aḌī uddān. In this versionĪ the exīwife rebutted his cḌaiḍ of drunkenness through the 
11. Wak ʿĪ A bār al‑quḍātĪ IIIĪ p. 19ī20.
12. AḌīKind Ī A bār quḍāt MiṣrĪ p. 322ī323.
13. AḌīKind Ī A bār quḍāt MiṣrĪ p. 344.
14. Wak ʿĪ A bār al‑quḍātĪ IĪ p. 313ī316.
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testimony of her recently‑freed slave, who asserted that the husband was sober. The qāḍī’s 
airḍation of the divorce sparked the ire of the governorĪ ʿAd  b. Ar ātĪ and forced Iyās 
to lee. These anecdotes obviousḌy touch upon a variety of coḍpḌicated ḌegaḌ questionsĪ 
incḌuding the appḌication of the tripḌe repudiation in a singḌe incidentĪ the efect of 
drunkenness on one’s competence to divorce, and the admissibility of testimony from 
feḍaḌe witnesses and freed sḌaves (whose ḍanuḍission ḍay have been a quid pro quo). 
The deḍonstration of the power dynaḍics between inluentiaḌ faḍiḌiesĪ governors and 
qāḍī‑s is also important. It is possible to draw a broad range of conclusions about Umayyad 
jurisprudence from this case alone, assuming that it represents normative practice and is 
not merely an entertaining story.
In another example, the Medinan qāḍī Abū Bakr b. ʿAbd aḌīRa ḍān (c. 114/732) 
rejected the legitimacy of a marriage that occurred without the consent of the bride’s 
family. Elopements and consequent unhappy families were likely as common in early 
Islamic times as they are today. What was unusual about this case, however, was that the 
grooḍ was Ayyūb b. SaḌaḍaĪ the caḌiph Hi āḍ’s uncḌe and the eḌoping bride was Fā iḍaĪ 
the granddaughter of aḌī asan b. ʿAḌ  b. Ab  āḌib. Her four brothers objected to the union 
and brought the matter before the governor who referred the case to the qāḍī.15 The qāḍī 
rejected the ḍarriageĪ sparking the ire of AyyūbĪ who refused to accept the qāḍī’s decision 
and subsequentḌy received a beating for his recaḌcitrance. Ayyūb then turned to his 
nephew the caḌiphĪ seeking his intervention. Hi āḍ’s response was soḍewhat confusing. 
He scolded his uncle and threatened to subject him to a worse beating, but then ultimately 
assisted him. He scolded the governor and ordered him to be beaten as well. However, the 
caliph also ordered all parties to accept the bride’s decision in the matter. Like the previous 
caseĪ this was no typicaḌ ḍarriage case and had signiicant sociaḌ and ḌegaḌ iḍpḌications. 
The caliph’s uncle was condemned for trying to circumvent the qāḍī, but the compromise 
allowed a prestigious woman to marry despite the objections of her family. The caliph also 
insulated the qāḍī from any retaliation for ruling against his kinsman, focusing his ire on 
the governor instead. This story aḌso has obvious ʿAḌidīUḍayyad undertonesĪ uḌtiḍateḌy 
diseḍpowering the ʿAḌid ḍen in the story by underḍining their controḌ over Fā iḍa’s 
ḍarriage. SigniicantḌyĪ the story ends with the siḍpḌe stateḍent that the two did not 
produce ofspring. Here againĪ powerfuḌ igures in society cḌashed in a case in which basic 
legal principles were at stake. In each of these cases, the qāḍī survived relatively unscathed, 
despite passing judgments against the interests of the powerful.
Qāḍī‑s also heard a variety of inheritance cases. Many of those reported deal with the 
ḍatheḍaticaḌ intricacies of the proper division of an estate aḍong diferent coḍbinations 
of survivors. Soḍe cases ofer ḍore speciic ḌegaḌ and societaḌ coḍḍentary. For instanceĪ 
the Egyptian qāḍī Ḫayr b. Nuʿayḍ (120ī127/737ī744) ruḌed that the son of a mukātab (a 
15. Wak ʿĪ A bār al‑quḍātĪ IĪ p. 172ī174. There is soḍe confusion in the report about whether Abū Bakr or ʿUbayd 
AḌḌāh b. afwān was the qāḍī who heard the case.
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sḌave given a contract of eḍancipation) couḌd not inherit.16 In a reḌated areaĪ aḌīKind  aḌso 
reports examples wherein the qāḍī was responsible for arranging the administration of the 
inheritance of minor orphans.17 In a more politically charged case, the Medinan qāḍī Saʿd 
b. Ibrah ḍ (c. 104/722) ruḌed that Isḍāʿ Ḍ b. ʿAbd AḌḌāhĪ the head of Quray  in MedinaĪ was 
required to provide funds to a needy kinsman.18 These examples involving “family law” 
illustrate the solutions the qāḍī‑s found to sometimes confusing legal problems, but they 
aḌso ofer insights into the sociaḌ and poḌiticaḌ power structure of the coḍḍunity.
Cases involving the qāḍī’s evaluation of the admissibility of certain types of witnesses 
also served multiple functions. While these cases are not numerous in the sources, they 
are instructive. For instance, the divorce case discussed above illustrates the consequences 
of a qāḍī’s determination of whether women or freed slaves could testify in such cases, 
ofering hints about their sociaḌ and ḌegaḌ status. In another exaḍpḌeĪ the Ḍegendary 
Kūfan qāḍī uray  b. aḌī āriṯ (c. 22ī79/643ī698?) refused to hear the testiḍony of a son to 
conirḍ his father’s accusationsĪ due to his inherent conlict of interest. uray  appḌied 
this standard even in a case in which the son in question was aḌī asan b. ʿAḌ Ī the heir 
to the reigning caliph.19 In this example, the rules of evidence were applied uniformly, 
despite the prestige of the Ḍitigant and witnessĪ neither of whoḍ objected to uray ’s 
ruling. The sources record other examples of qāḍī‑s rejecting testimony for a variety of 
reasons. For instance, the Egyptian qāḍī Tawba b. Naḍir (115ī120/733ī738) refused to aḌḌow 
testiḍony froḍ a ḍan who had deied hiḍ in a previous case.20 The Damascene qāḍīĪ BiḌāḌ 
b. Ab  aḌīDardā’ (60ī65/678ī684) not onḌy refused testiḍony froḍ dishonest witnessesĪ 
but reportedly beat them and, in some cases, tied them to the columns of the mosque to 
humiliate them publicly.21 These reports do not name the alleged liars, but suggest that 
the qāḍī had broad latitude to determine who would be heard in his court and to impose 
consequences for perjury or deiance. Other reports are Ḍess speciicĪ siḍpḌy noting kinds 
of testimony particular qāḍī‑s would admit. For example, the Egyptian qāḍī Ḫayr b. Nuʿayḍ 
(120ī127/738ī745) wouḌd aḌḌow testiḍony froḍ ChristiansĪ Jews and youths in soḍe cases.22 
The Medinan qāḍī SaḌaḍa b. ʿAbd AḌḌāh (101ī104/719ī722) perḍitted testiḍony froḍ youths 
as well.23 The earlier Medinan qāḍī Abū Bakr b. Mu aḍḍad aḌīAn ār  (93ī96/711ī714) 
accepted the testiḍony of a son on behaḌf of his ḍotherĪ in contrast to uray ’s rejection 
of testiḍony on behaḌf of one’s parents. Abū Bakr aḌso accepted the testiḍony of soḍeone 
16. AḌīKind Ī A bār quḍāt MiṣrĪ p. 350ī351.
17. AḌīKind Ī A bār quḍāt MiṣrĪ p. 325Ī 341; aḌīMizz Ī Tahḏīb al‑kamālĪ XVIIĪ p. 412.
18. Wak ʿĪ A bār al‑quḍātĪ IĪ p. 154ī155.
19. Ibn ʿAsākirĪ Ta’rī  madīnat DimašqĪ XXIIIĪ p. 26.
20. AḌīKind Ī A bār quḍāt MiṣrĪ p. 344.
21. Ibn ʿAsākirĪ Ta’rī  madīnat DimašqĪ XĪ p. 526; aḌīMizz Ī Tahḏīb al‑kamālĪ IVĪ p. 286.
22. AḌīKind Ī A bār quḍāt MiṣrĪ p. 350ī351.
23. Wak ʿĪ A bār al‑quḍātĪ IĪ p. 148ī150.
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who had previously made false accusations.24 While these Umayyad‑era examples do not 
yet point to ixed ruḌes about whose testiḍony is accepted under what circuḍstancesĪ 
they do illustrate that the qāḍī had a degree of discretion in determining what evidence to 
accept and that the social status of the litigants was largely irrelevant to the determination 
of whether their testimony would be admitted.
In addition to these types of cases, the sources preserve a number of reports involving 
property disputes of various sorts. For exaḍpḌeĪ Saʿd b. Ibrah ḍ had to deterḍine 
ownership of a wādī that was disputed between descendents of ʿAḌ  and Muʿāwiyya.25 In 
another Medinan caseĪ his successorĪ Saʿ d b. SuḌayḍān (104ī106/722ī724) ruḌed against 
the governorĪ ʿAbd aḌīWā id for extorting ḍoney froḍ viḌḌagers outside Medina.26 In one 
of the only Umayyad‑era cases recorded that involved a wrongful death, the Egyptian qāḍī 
ʿIyā  b. ʿUbayd AḌḌāh (93ī100/711ī718) deterḍined that a mawla who was using a horse 
(rather than the horse’s owner) was required to pay the bḌood price for a woḍan whoḍ the 
horse ran over and killed.27 As in the “family law” examples, the cases that were preserved 
ofered iḍpḌicit coḍḍentary both on ḌegaḌ technicaḌities and society at Ḍarge. They ofer 
glimpses of interactions between elites and common people, including unnamed villagers 
and mawālī, in front of the qāḍī. The underlying theme of these cases is, again, the qāḍī’s 
extensive authority over litigants from all elements of society.
The consistency of this theḍe suggests that one of the agendas Wak ʿĪ aḌīKind  and 
others pursued was to ofer a coḍḍentary on the extent of the qāḍī’s jurisdiction during 
the Uḍayyad period. CḌearḌyĪ these are not ǦnorḍaḌǧ ḍundane cases that one wouḌd ind in 
a true administrative archive, nor are they random collections of anecdotes. Instead, later 
compilers found these cases worthy of preservation for two apparent reasons.
FirstĪ a nuḍber of these and siḍiḌar cases ofer soḌutions to speciic ḌegaḌ probḌeḍs. 
Anecdotes in which Umayyad qāḍī‑s rule on inheritance percentages, the status of particular 
witnessesĪ the vaḌidity of ḍarriagesĪ and other questions have ḌegaḌ signiicance. They can 
provide precedents for later legal practice or, perhaps, criticism of later digressions from 
ideal practice. Whether these anecdotes are genuine representations of Umayyad judicial 
practice or apocryphal reports to justify later practice is, of course, still open to debate.
The second apparent purpose for these anecdotes is to ofer insights into the nature and 
function of the qāḍīship and the qāḍī’s position in society. Many of the cases preserved by 
Wak ʿĪ aḌīKind  and the biographicaḌ sources deḍonstrate the power dynaḍics in Uḍayyad 
society. Many of the cases mentioned above, and others like them, describe the qāḍī 
iḍposing his wiḌḌ on powerfuḌ ḍeḍbers of society. For exaḍpḌeĪ Saʿd b. Ibrāh ḍ resisted the 
deiant chief of Quray Ī Saʿ d b. SuḌayḍān passed judgḍent against the governor who had 
24. Wak ʿĪ A bār al‑quḍātĪ IĪ p. 144Ī 146.
25. Wak ʿĪ A bār al‑quḍātĪ IĪ p. 153ī154.
26. Wak ʿĪ A bār al‑quḍātĪ IĪ p. 167ī168; aḌīMizz Ī Tahḏīb al‑kamālĪ XĪ p. 483.
27. AḌīKind Ī A bār quḍāt MiṣrĪ p. 333ī334.
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appointed hiḍĪ and Abū Bakr b. ʿAbd aḌīRa ḍān ruḌed against the caḌiph’s own kinsḍan 
without sufering repercussions.
These cases may, in part, have served to glorify particular qāḍī‑s by showing their 
fearlessness in the face of power. Such demonstrations of independence were perhaps 
necessary for separating their legacies from their Umayyad masters. The scholars who 
served as qāḍī‑s for the Umayyads were typically respected muḥaddiṯ‑s, whose importance 
to the enterprise of ḥadīṯ transmission outlived them. These scholars were necessary links 
between later traditionists and earlier generations. However, their service to the Umayyad 
dynastyĪ which Ḍater ʿAbbāsid schoḌars denigrated for its iḍḍoraḌityĪ couḌd tarnish their 
legacies. Illustrations of their independence could blunt accusations of complicity with 
their Umayyad employers. Hence, one cannot entirely dismiss the potential polemical 
importance of these reports.
At the same time, however, these cases also demonstrate important assumptions about 
the extent of the qāḍī’s jurisdiction, which do not appear to support a narrative of underlying 
resistance to the Umayyad authorities. The examples discussed above indicate that the 
political and social status of the litigants did not place them outside the qāḍī’s jurisdiction 
or beyond his reach. In these cases, neither tribal connections nor political position tainted 
the qāḍī’s objectivity. In this regardĪ the case in which Saʿ d b. SuḌayḍān ruḌed against the 
governor of Medina is particularly important. This case clearly demonstrates that the qāḍī 
was not merely the arm of the governor who appointed him, but that the governor himself 
was subject to the qāḍī’s judgḍent. Put siḍpḌyĪ in areas where the qāḍī had jurisdiction, 
exceptions were not ḍade for rank or oice. WhiḌe these cases are not nuḍerousĪ they are 
consistent in emphasizing the qāḍī’s authority. Moreover, they are not told in a manner 
that appears to be intent on glorifying the anti‑elite escapades of the qāḍī, but rather in a 
manner that underscores the futility of attempting to evade the authority inherent to the 
qāḍī’s position.
Areas outside the jurisdiction of the qāḍī
Before turning to areas where the qāḍī did not appear to have jurisdiction, it is 
iḍportant to pause to consider an iḍportant Ḍacuna in the reports preserved in Wak ʿ and 
other sources. In the reports associated with some 75 qāḍī‑s examined in this study, there 
is a conspicuous absence of cases involving murder, or wrongful death of any sort. In fact, 
there are no examples of homicide cases heard by Umayyad qāḍī‑s, or of disputes over the 
payḍent of bḌood prices (diya) or the proper aḍount of such payḍents. WhiḌe it is possibḌe 
that isolated cases may have been overlooked, it is surprising that murder cases do not 
appear to have attracted the attention of the sources. There are some references to qāḍī‑s 
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imposing ḥadd punishments, often at the mosque, but the context makes clear that these 
are beatings rather than amputations or executions.28
This silence about murder has several implications for our understanding of early 
Islamic society and jurisprudence. If, as suggested above, one of the purposes of the 
coḍpiḌers of this ḍateriaḌ was to record power conlicts aḍong the eḌitesĪ why are there 
no ḍurder cases? SureḌy faḍiḌies and cḌans of both victiḍs and those accused wouḌd try 
to inluence the proceedings in such cases. PowerfuḌ eḌites wouḌd be expected to atteḍpt 
to bend the rules to their advantage in such critical circumstances. Such cases ought to 
have attracted a certain prurient interest from the public as well. Even in modern times, 
the drama of a murder trial outshines the most contentious celebrity divorce case or 
inheritance dispute. YetĪ the Uḍayyadīera accounts are siḌent about such cases.
Are we to assume that murder cases were so universally mundane and legally 
insigniicant that the sources did not bother to report theḍ? Were there no questions 
about evidence or the admissibility of witnesses, issues that normally would have fallen to 
the qāḍī? Are we to concḌude that the rise of IsḌaḍ produced such a harḍonious society that 
hoḍicides ceased? Or was there soḍe other foruḍ in which these cases were adjudicated? 
If soĪ it is not speciicaḌḌy ḍentioned in sources for the Uḍayyad period. These reḍain 
open questions for further investigation.
The lack of murder cases in accounts of the qāḍī‑s has a broader implication for 
understanding early Islamic society. Traditional narratives, both Islamic and Orientalist, 
have treated the pre‑Islamic period as one of lawlessness, dominated by incessant blood 
feuds. According to this narrative, Islam contained the blood feud and imposed legal 
dispute resolution processes instead. One would expect the adjudication of these disputes 
to be memorialized in accounts of the courts where these disputes ought to have been 
heard. If they were not heard by the qāḍī‑s, then who adjudicated such cases and in what 
foruḍ? The Ḍack of such reports is puzzḌing and ḍerits ḍore inquiry.
We do ind signiicant exaḍpḌes of other types of cases that were outside the qāḍī’s 
jurisdiction, though this distinction is not described explicitly. Qāḍī‑s did not adjudicate 
cases involving the trial and punishment of heretics and rebels, nor did they decide 
questions regarding the distribution of spoils during conquest. These cases fell under 
the direct jurisdiction of the caliph or the governor. In the case of spoils division, some 
authority was delegated to the amīr in the ieḌd.
Wak ʿ and aḌīKind  do not describe Uḍayyadīera cases invoḌving heretics and rebeḌs. 
Such cases do, however, appear in the historical sources and in biographical reports of the 
participants. I have discussed these heresy trials extensively in other contexts and will 
not revisit these cases individually here. Instead, for the purpose of understanding the 
limits of the qāḍī’s jurisdiction, it is important simply to note that these cases were heard 
28. For exaḍpḌes of beatingsĪ see Ibn ʿAsākirĪ Ta’rī  madīnat DimašqĪ XĪ p. 256; XXIXĪ p. 281; Wak ʿĪ A bār al‑quḍāt, I, 
p. 157Ī 173; IIĪ p. 41; IIIĪ p. 8. I have found no descriptions of Uḍayyad qāḍī‑s imposing amputations or executions.
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not by the qāḍī, but by the governor or the caliph himself. It is clear that some sort of trial 
occurred in these instances, but it was not a trial before a qāḍī.
For exaḍpḌeĪ ḍost reports indicate that the heretic Maʿbad aḌī uhan  (d. c. 80/699) 
was tried and executed by the Iraqi governor aḌī a ā  b. YūsufĪ or perhaps by the caḌiph 
ʿAbd aḌīMaḌik hiḍseḌf.29 A few decades ḌaterĪ another ceḌebrated hereticĪ aḌī aʿd b. Dirhaḍ 
(d. c. 124/742) was tried and put to death by aḌīHa ā ’s successor ḪāḌid aḌīQasr Ī who 
served as prosecutor, judge and executioner.30 None of the extant reports of these heresy 
trials mentions any role whatsoever for the qāḍī.
Reports on two other heresy cases do mention the participation of scholars who served 
as qāḍī‑s. These cases illustrate clearly that judging heretics was outside the parameters of 
the qāḍī’s jurisdiction. Soḍe accounts of the triaḌ and execution of aḌī āriṯ b. Saʿ d aḌīKaḏḏāb 
(d. 80/699) indicate that a proḍinent muḥaddiṯ heard aḌī āriṯ procḌaiḍ his outrageous 
views and proḍptḌy reported aḌī āriṯ to Abū Idr s aḌīḪawḌān Ī the qāḍī in Damascus. The 
qāḍī’s response is instructive. Rather than calling the alleged heretic before his court for 
questioningĪ Abū Idr s inforḍed the caḌiph of aḌī āriṯ’s stateḍents. ʿAbd aḌīMaḌik hiḍseḌf 
then took action against aḌī āriṯ.31 The qāḍī cḌearḌy recognized that aḌī āriṯ’s case was 
beyond his jurisdiction and referred the matter to the caliph. The only other heresy trial in 
which the qāḍī pḌayed a roḌe was that of ĠayḌān aḌīDiḍa q Ī in which aḌīAwzāʿ  (d. 157/774) 
served as prosecutor rather than as qāḍī. The caḌiph Hi āḍ (r. 105ī125/724ī743) passed 
judgḍent on ĠayḌān and sentenced hiḍ after hearing aḌīAwzāʿ ’s interrogation of the 
suspected heretic.32 It is essentiaḌĪ howeverĪ to note thatĪ whiḌe aḌīAwzāʿ  ḍay have served 
briely as a qāḍī ḌaterĪ there is no evidence that he served in that capacity during Hi āḍ’s 
reign. These two cases illustrate clearly that adjudicating heresy cases was beyond the 
qāḍī’s purview. In one, the qāḍī ḍereḌy refers the case. In the other aḌīAwzāʿ Ī who was at 
this time an advisor and possible future qāḍī, served as prosecutor rather than judge.
Judging rebels was also beyond the boundaries of the qāḍī’s jurisdiction. There are 
numerous examples of rebels being tried and put to death, but it is always the governor or 
the caliph who presides over these events. There are no Umayyad‑era examples in which the 
qāḍī played any role at all in the adjudication of cases involving open rebellion. It appears that 
both doctrinaḌ ofenses and insurrections were outside the paraḍeters of the qāḍī’s authority.
The distribution of spoils was also outside the qāḍī’s jurisdiction. There is an extensive 
literature on the minutia of dividing the spoils of conquest in various siyar works.33 These 
works discuss in detail what constitutes legitimate spoils and how and when such riches 
could be divided among the troops. Nowhere in the literature on the Umayyad period is 
there any mention of a role for the qāḍī in the division of spoils. Religious scholars were 
29. Judd 2011Ī p. 4ī6
30. Judd 2011Ī p. 8ī9
31. Ibn a arĪ Lisān al‑mizānĪ IIĪ p. 151ī152; Wak ʿĪ A bār al‑quḍātĪ IIIĪ p. 202; aḌīMizz Ī Tahḏīb al‑kamālĪ XXIIIĪ p. 443ī447.
32. Judd 1999Ī p. 170ī172
33. For the ḍost extensive coḌḌection of Uḍayyadīera reportsĪ see aḌīFazār Ī Kitāb al‑siyar. 
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certainḌy present at the frontier and ofered expert opinions on a variety of issuesĪ incḌuding 
a nuḍber of truḌy pecuḌiar but pḌausibḌe cases. HoweverĪ they onḌy ofered advice and did 
not adjudicate. The oice of qāḍī l‑ askar, whose function is well‑known in later periods, 
did not yet exist in the Umayyad period.34 Instead, authority over military encounters and 
their aftermaths rested solidly with the amīr.
Conclusion
This examination of actual cases, or the absence of actual cases, can lead us to several 
conclusions about the extent of the Umayyad qāḍī’s jurisdiction. First, it is clear that the 
qāḍī was not merely an extension of the governor. In some areas of jurisdiction, such as 
rebellion, the governor did not rely on the qāḍī at all. In other areas, as several examples 
demonstrate, the qāḍī couḌd rebuke and/or punish even the governor hiḍseḌf.
In general, the qāḍī appears to have had exclusive authority over disputes between 
ḌitigantsĪ in essence tort cases broadḌy deined to incḌude criḍinaḌ ḍatters in which a 
victiḍ sufered daḍages of soḍe sort. These cases incḌuded property disputesĪ faḍiḌy Ḍaw 
and criḍes against individuaḌ victiḍs (though perhaps not hoḍicides). In these reaḌḍsĪ 
the qāḍī’s authority was absolute. Neither social status nor government position could 
undermine the qāḍī’s power. Several of the anecdotes described above illustrate the futility 
of eforts by eḌites to evade the qāḍī’s judgment. The qāḍī did not, however, enjoy absolute 
autonomy. There are several examples in which the qāḍī’s abuse of his oice Ḍed to disḍissaḌ 
and punishment from the governor. At the same time, within his jurisdictional boundaries, 
the qāḍī generaḌḌy couḌd not be deiedĪ even by the governor who appointed hiḍ.
The qāḍī’s jurisdiction did not extend to what we would now describe as crimes against 
the state. Instances of rebellion, whether military or doctrinal, were outside the realm of 
the qāḍī’s authority. These were not tort cases, or crimes against individuals, but political 
crimes that were adjudicated by the political leaders of the community. The distribution 
of spoils was also outside the qāḍī’s realm. Here, wealth acquired by the state through its 
military function was distributed to individual subjects. The military amīr held authority 
over this process. Again, there was no tort‑like dispute involved in questions of distribution 
of spoils. Questions centered instead on how the state should distribute its largesse.
The cases examined here suggest that the qāḍī’s authority was ḍore cḌearḌy deined 
than has been assumed. He was not merely an extension of the governor, whom he could 
defy and even punish in some circumstances. Instead, the qāḍī was perhaps closer to the 
pre‑Islamic ḥakam, whose principal function was to resolve disputes between individual 
litigants. However, unlike the ḥakam, the qāḍī enjoyed a surprising degree of independence 
within the circumscribed sphere of his authority. He could defy those who appointed him, 
but only within the established, albeit unspoken, boundaries of his jurisdiction.
34. Regarding the qāḍī l‑ askar during the earḌy ʿAbbāsid periodĪ see tillier 2009Ī esp. p. 334 f.
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